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BOOK REVIEWS
.AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PMILOSOPHY or LAW. Revised Edition. By Roscoe Pound.' New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1954.
Pp. ix, 201. $3.50. This book is a revision and expansion of the
original Storrs Lectures which Dean Pound delivered at the Yale
Law School in 1921-22. Since that time a number of new legal
problems have arisen which made necessary some rewriting
changes and additions to the original version.
By way of an introductory remark Dean Pound observes that
the legal philosophies of the past have become a potent force in
the administration of justice of the present: they have been instrumental in abolishing outworn traditions, banishing caprice,
carrying new ideas into the law, systematizing existing legal
materials, and strengthening established rules of law. But more
than that; they have tried to provide man with a complete and
final picture of what constitutes proper social control by laying
down a moral, legal and political chart for all time. Believing
that they could uncover the everlasting, unchangeable legal reality, they have attempted to establish a perfect law by which
human relations might forever be ordered without uncertainty
and without further need for change. The ideal of such a perfect
law has been envisioned by the ancient Greek philosophers or
sophists, the Roman jurisconsults, the Mediaeval scholastics and
the modern jurists, no matter what their particular philosophical
persuasion or method might have been.
Dean Pound then goes on (in chapter two) to discuss the end
of law which, in his opinion, originally was a political rather
than a legal question. Legal philosophy, he maintains, was, and
still is, primarily concerned with the nature of law and-the basis
of its authority, rather than with the end of law. Throughout
recorded history it was held, at one time or another, that law is
(1) a divinely ordained rule for human action; (2) a tradition
of the old customs which have proved acceptable to the gods and,
hence, are safe guides for human conduct; (3) the recorded wisdom of the wise men who had learned the divinely approved
and, therefore, safe course for human conduct; (4) a philosophically discovered system of principles expressing the nature of
things, to which man ought to conform in his conduct; (5) a
body of ascertainments and declarations of an eternal and immutable basic moral code; (6) a body of agreements of men in
politically organized society as to their mutual relations; (7)
1
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the reflection of the divine reason governing the universe; (8)
a body of commands of the sovereign authority in a politically
organized society as to how men should conduct themselves; (9)
a system of precepts, discovered by human experience, whereby
the individual may achieve a maximum of freedom consonant
with the like freedom of others; (10) a system of principles,
discovered by philosophy, whereby the actions of man are evaluated either by reason or by the manner in which they can be
harmonized with the actions of his fellow men; (11) a body or
system of rules imposed on man by a dominant class in furtherance of its own interests; and (12) a body of dictates of economic
or social laws, discovered by experience and applied through the
principle of expediency.
All these philosophical definitions of law, no matter how different and even irreconcilable they may be with one another,
have one fundamental idea in common: the quest for some ultimate single basis for ordering human conduct and for adjusting
human relations beyond the reach of human caprice as well as
above the constant flux of historical existence. Dean Pound,
however, concedes that the faith in such a perfect law (which in
the opinion of the present reviewer would be anything but "perfect") together with the belief in limitless opportunity which
men only need freedom to realize, has all but faded. Instead of
the perfect law man now clamors for a new humanitarian ideal,
for a sort of greater equality in the satisfaction of human wants
and demands which liberty alone apparently can no longer afford
him. Returning to the theories about the end of law which have
been developed by legal philosophers, Dean Pound recognizes
five basic ends: (1) to keep the peace at all events and at any
price; (2) to preserve the social status quo; (3) to bring about
a maximum of individual free self-assertion; (4) to protect and
give effect to human rights; and (5) to guarantee a maximum
of satisfaction of human wants through a minimum of social
friction and economic loss.
The application of law, that is, the adjudication of a controversy according to law, Dean Pound insists in chapter three, is
more than mere mechanical fitting of the "case" into a legal
"strait jacket." Application requires three important steps: (1)
finding the law to be applied (or, if none is applicable, devising
a rule on the basis of given materials which the legal system
points out); (2) interpreting the rule so chosen by determining
its meaning; and (3) applying to the facts the rule so found and
interpreted. Contrary to the separation of powers theory, which
insists that courts take the law as they find it; what actually
goes on in the name of interpretation is often an outright "law
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making process" which frequently supplies a new law. In other
words, the doctrine that law may only be "found," but never
made, at least not by the courts, is in Dean Pound's opinion a
pious fiction which, if it were true, would deprive the courts of
all power to exercise creative reason. Interpretation, therefore,
implies law making and even "administration." The problem of
application constantly touches upon questions of intelligent selection and discretion, so necessary for the operation of a mature
and efficient system of law where the individualization of the
application of law is of paramount importance.
Present-day jurisprudence, in the main, advances three distinct
theories of application of law which, in some way, are antagonistic to one another, namely, (1) the analytical theory which proceeds from the erroneous assumption that the law is something
complete and without gaps or contradictions and, hence, can without fail be applied to any fact situation that may possibly arise;
(2) the historical theory which insists that all law is growth and
development along certain lines and, as such, merely declaratory
of certain basic principles or ideas which gradually evolve
through history; and (3) what Dean Pound calls the "equitable
theory" which is primarily concerned with a reasonable and just
determination of each individual controversy rather than with
a mechanical adjudication. This equitable theory endows the
courts with much (and in the opinion of its opponents, too much)
free play and leeway in dealing with a concrete case so as to meet
the demands of justice between the parties and accord with the
dictates of reason and morality. Dean Pound believes, however,
that these conflicting three theories of application and interpretation could somewhat be reconciled if we were to ask ourselves
the following question: may we not find the proper domain of
each of these three theories by examining the means through
which in fact we are able to achieve the desired concrete individualization that does not exist in theory? For pure theory denies
individualization, while any just and workable application abhors
generalization and mechanization. In the United States today,
there are no less than seven possible agencies for individualizing
the application of law: (1) the discretion of the courts in the
application of equitable remedies; (2) the application of legal
standards of conduct; (3) the power of juries to render general
verdicts; (4) the latitude of judicial application involved in finding the appropriate law; (5) devices for adjusting penal treatment to the individual offender (Dean Pound rightly holds that
the punishment should fit the criminal rather than the crime);
(6) informal methods of judicial administration in petty courts;
and (7) administrative tribunals.
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By liability, which he discusses in chapter four, Dean Pound
means a situation whereby one may exact legally and the other
is legally subjected to the exaction. Liability started as a duty
to compound for "injury" to man or gods or people, lest they be
moved to vengeance (composition); and developed into liability
to answer either for injuries caused or promises made (compensation). Thus liability came to mean either a duty to repair or
a duty to carry out some formal undertaking. Consideration back
of this duty "to carry out something," however, came much later;
it came with equity where "intention" and "good faith" were
afforded a foremost place. During the nineteenth century, which
believed in the greatest possible individual liberty, it was held
that law should give the widest effect to the declared will of the
individual. Consequently, liability could flow only from freely
assumed duties (contract) or from culpable conduct (tort). Contractural or relational liability may be reduced to the following
"postulate" or formula: In civilized society man must
be able
to assume that those with whom he deals in the general intercourse of society will act in good faith. From this it follows that
he may surmise that his fellow men will make good reasonable
expectations created by their reasonable promises or other conduct; that his fellow men will carry out their undertakings
according to the expectations which the moral sentiment of the
community attaches thereto; that his fellow men will conduct
themselves with zeal and fidelity in relations, offices and callings;
and that his fellow men will restore in specie or by equivalent
what comes to them by mistake or unanticipated situations
whereby they receive what they could not have expected reasonably to receive under such circumstances.
The notion of culpable conduct (tort) soon led to the common
law theory that tort liability was a corollary of fault and, hence,
that there could be no liability where there was no fault. This
view of "liability for fault" has its ultimate roots in the essential
identification of law and morals. But soon it was felt that, as a
matter of policy, liability could not always be restricted to fault.
This led to a thorough revision of tort liability, to the doctrine
of liability without fault which, however, was not universally
accepted by all jurisdictions. Dean Pound believes that this new
doctrine is fully in keeping with the basic postulates of civilization formulated by him, namely, first, that in civilized society
man may assume that no one will attack him; secondly, that in
civilized society man must be able to assume that his fellow men,
when they are in a course of conduct, will act with due care;
and, thirdly, that in civilized society man must be able to assume
that others, who keep things or maintain conditions or employ
agencies that are likely to get out of hand or escape or do dam-
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age, will restrain them or keep them within proper bounds. In
other words, general security is threatened (and, hence, liability
arises) by willful aggression, by affirmative action without due
regard for others in the mode of conducting it, or by harboring
or maintaining or failing to restrain things or employing agencies
likely to escape or go out of bounds and do damage. The ultimate
basis of tort liability, therefore, is the social interest in general
security. Hence law no longer looks at the culpable exercise of
the will, but rather at the effect - the danger - the actor has upon
general security. This new theory of "absolute liability" seems
to maintain that negligence is established by liability, not liability
by negligence. In the case of workmen's compensation, for example, the liability is based on the legal responsibility to the public
flowing from the control of property, a theory which was advanced by Professor Friedmann. Dean Pound also believes that
more recent developments of this liability notion are connected
with the new idea of the "service state" which supposedly is to
fulfill the general human expectation that in civilized society
everyone may expect a full economic and social life. Liability,
he deplores, has extended the concept of general security to include security against one's own fault, improvidence or ill luck,
or even to one's own defects of character. This new concept of
security (and liability), which Dean Pound discusses also in his
New Paths of the Law, seems to .require reparation at someone's
expense of all loss to everyone, no matter how caused or incurred,
thereby shifting the burden from the luckless victim of injury
to the public, without fault of anyone. In this fashion man is no
longer his brother's keeper, but actually his insurer. Dean Pound
insists that this new "policy of liability" is indicative of a new
and, in his opinion, pernicious postulate, namely, that in civilized
society man is entitled to assume that he will be secured by the
service state against all loss or injury, even though the result
of his own fault or own improvidence, and that liability to repair
all loss or injury will be cast by the law on someone deemed
better able to bear it.
When discussing the problem of property in chapter five, Dean
Pound starts out with the postulate, devised by him, that in
civilized society as we know it, man must be able to assume that
he may control, for purposes beneficial to himself, what he
has discovered and appropriated to his own use, what he has
created by his own labor, and what he has acquired under the
existing social and economic order. This control also includes
the security of transactions. As of late, he observes, acquisition
by discovery or occupation, however, tends to become somewhat
restricted. The appropriation or use of important social or natural resources, for example, has become the subject of much
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statutory restriction and regulation so as to eliminate possible
friction and economic waste. Thus it appears that some of these
resources are now considered "property of the state" or, perhaps
more correctly, are "owned by the state in trust for the people,"
where this "state ownership" is really a sort of guardianship for
social purposes.
After having discussed the various legal and philosophical
theories about property and its justification, Dean Pound distinguishes three "grades" or stages in man's power or capacity for
influencing the acts of others with respect to corporeal objects.
One stage is a mere condition of fact, a mere physical holding
of or control over the thing (custody). The other stage, which
is called the "juristic possession," signifies a possession protected
and maintained by law as well as by a claim, supported by law,
to have a thing restored should it have been improperly alienated.
In the final stage the law secures to man the exclusive enjoyment
of control over objects far beyond his capacity either to hold the
thing in custody or to possess it. This is called the "interest in
substance" of which the law must take account, the more so,
since property, as a medium that secures a maximum of human
interests as well as satisfies a maximum of human wants, is a
social institution based upon an economic need in society and
upon a natural instinct of acquisitiveness. Dean Pound concludes
his observations about property with the remark that the present
law of property is a wise bit of social engineering in our particular world in that it satisfies effectively more human wants and
secures efficiently more human needs or interests than anything
we are likely to devise in its place.
The contract, which Dean Pound discusses in the last chapter,
is concerned with promises- with the satisfaction of reasonable
expectations created by reasonable promises and agreements. In
any civilized society, Dean Pound insists, man must be able to
assume that reasonable promises are carried out according to
reasonable expectations created by the promises. The keeping
of such promises as well as the stability of promises in general
is of prime social importance to any commercial society. After
having compared the different ways in which the civil law and
the common law enforce a valid promise, Dean Pound points out
that the Anglo-American law of contracts, at least during the
seventeenth century, made four types of promises legally enforceable, namely, (1) a formal acknowledgment of indebtedness by
bond under seal, often conditional upon performance of a promise
for which it was a bond, acknowledging thereby an "equivalent";
(2) a covenant or undertaking under seal, where the seal implied
or presupposed an "equivalent"; (3) a real contract of debt,
where the obligation arose from the detention of something by
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him to whom it had been delivered; and (4) a simple promise
upon consideration, that is, in exchange for an act or for another
promise, where the other act or counter-promise was the motive
or "consideration" for the promise, and the cause or reason for
making it was the equivalent for which the promisor chose to
assume the undertaking. Until the common law was finally
settled during the nineteenth century, equity frequently used
consideration to mean not an equivalent but any reason whatever
for making the promise. Later during the nineteenth century,
when the principle of freedom of contract became all-important,
it was reasoned that in contract the idea of human freedom could
attain its fullest realization, and that contract was the ideal means
of promoting a maximum of human happiness through the promotion of the greatest possible free self-assertion of the indvidual. Conversely, a maximum enforcement of contractual obligation was demanded: men of full age and competent understanding were to have the utmost liberty of contracting and such contracts were to be fully enforced.
Dean Pound points out that none of the four theories concerned
with the enforcement of contractual promises, which are current
today (the will theory, the bargain theory, the equivalent theory
and the injurious-reliance theory), is really adequate. Among
these four theories the bargain theory, which in essence is a
development of the equivalent theory, is the most accepted in
modern common law thinking. But courts seem to be trying to
get away from the bargain theory and enforce promises which
are neither bargains nor can be stated as such. We have but to
remember gratuitous promises afterwards acted on, promises
based on moral obligations, certain cases of "waiver," etc. As a
matter of fact, Lord Mansfield's proposition that no promise made
as a business transaction can be nudum pactum, has been nearly
realized today. Dean Pound is of the opinion that philosophical
jurisprudence has its first and perhaps its greatest opportunity
in the Anglo-American law of contracts. Given an attractive
philosophical theory of enforcing promises, American courts
might reform the law of contract and thereby develop a truly
workable system along new lines. A great service would be rendered by a philosophy which could formulate the idea of good
faith as regards promises in a manner that might be acceptable to
the courts in that it furnishes them with a rational critique, a
workable measure of decision and an ideal of what the law seeks
to do, whereby to carry forward the process of enlarging the
domain of legally enforceable promises. Unfortunately, neither
Dean Pound nor any other philosopher has come up with such
a theory.
Dean Pound also notices the gradual disappearance of free
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contract and a development in the direction of "contractual dirigism," to use a term coined by the French jurist, Josserand.
Standard contracts, statutory obligatory clauses in contracts, insurance contracts, etc., would be instances of this "dirigism"
which prescribes rather than enforces contracts. Another feature
of modern contract law which Dean Pound notices, is the growing
tendency to insist that the creditor, too, must take risks, either
along with or in some instances instead of the debtor. Statutes,
for example, provide a number of restrictions upon the power
of the creditor to exact satisfaction. But this was done, Dean
Pound maintains, primarily in order to secure the social interest
in individual life. But this trend has gone further: it is held in
some quarters that man has a claim against society to rejieve him
of a burden which he has freely and fairly assumed. This trend
has been greatly aided by the new "prediction theory of contract"
which insists that a contract is nothing more than a prediction
of the ability and willingness to do something at some future
time. Legislation, too, often for the alleged purpose of extending
the "police power" into the economic life of a nation, has done
much to impair contractual obligations, thus undermining the
feeling of a moral duty to perform. It could be said that the
nineteenth century carried to an extreme the principle of letting
people of full age and sound mind contract most freely and holding them rigidly to the contract they had made. The twentieth
century, on the other hand, seems to carry to an undesirable
extreme the policy of restricting the freedom of contract, of making contracts over for the policy of restricting the freedom of
contract, of making contracts over for the parties by judicial
action, and of relaxing obligations arising under a valid contract.
The Introduction to the Philosophy of Law is a truly remarkable work which fully bears out Holmes' famous remark
to Pollock: "The number of things that chap [meaning Pound]
knows drives me silly."'2 Its particular value consists in the fact
that it reflects the revolutionary transition from the legal thinking of the nineteenth century to that of the twentieth century.
Probably more than anyone else, Dean Pound is responsible for
this transition, beginning with his famous address, Causes of
PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administrationof Justice,3 which
he delivered before the American Bar Association on August 29,
1906, certainly a noteworthy date in the annals of American
jurisprudence. This address, as Dean Wigmore has pointed out,
became "the spark that kindled the white flame of progress" in
the field of American law and American jurisprudence. The
2
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Introduction, written fifteen years later, added fuel to this spark.
Anton-Hernmnn Chroust*

LAw

AND

MoRAm y. By Leon Petrazycki.'

Cambridge: Har-

vard University Press, 1955. Pp. vni, 335. $7.50. Leon Petrazycki
was born in 1867 into a family of old Polish nobility.2 Although
in the introduction to the above mentioned work, Professor Timasheff writes that Petrazycki was a leading Russian philosopher,
we would like to point out that he was Polish. The fact that he
had published some of his excellent monographs on Roman Law
in German and his theories on law and morality in Russian does
not make him either a German or a Russian legal philosopher.
Petrazycki's origin had a great bearing on the development of
his mind and character. His mind was that of a Westerner. He
was a realist, devoted to observation, experiment and to establishing principles of scientific classification of the phenomena under
observation. His mind was averse to both: German metaphysics
of Kant and Hegel, and the German apotheosis of the state, as
well as the soul searching meditations a la Dostoyevsky. While
his works are imbued with a spirit of idealism and a certain influence of Russian philosophy may be traced in his works,
idealism in legal philosophy is not a specific Russian characteristic. It is also a typical feature of the Polish mind-that when
faced with a purely theoretical doctrine it fathoms always the
pragmatic and idealistic question: whether and how does this
doctrine aid the community, the nation and mankind?
Petrazycki looked askance at the emergence of powerful militaristic states in the second half to the nineteenth century, and
fought against the theory that the state and its machinery of
physical enforcement are the sources of law. Montesquieu made
a remark that the old Polish constitution was made up in such a
way that each individual endowed with civil and political rights
is to be considered as a sovereign. (Esprit des lois, passim). The
echo of this idea is reflected also in Petrazycki's theory of law.
He states namely: ".... the number of the spheres where legal phenomena are is the same as the number of living creatures capable
of experiencing - and in fact experiencing - the corresponding
*
1
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tieth centuries. Former Professor at the Universities of Petersburg and
Warsaw. Author of many works in Polish, Russian and German.
2 Text, Introduction at xxi.
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mental states.. .- 3 Petrazycki reduced the nature of the state to
the idea of an independent social organization, and taught that
the power of the state is created for the purpose of serving the
welfare of the members of the state community.
When Petrazycki started his writing career, the following materialistic and egoistic views were very popular: (1) The purpose
of law is the protection of individualistic interests. (2) Might goes
before right.
In his monographs: Die Fruchtverteiiung beim Wechsel des
Nutzungsberechtigten (Berlin, 1892), and Die Lehre von Einkommen (Berlin, 1893-1896), Petrazycki analyzed the ethical and
economic consequences of different institutions of Roman Law.
The conclusions he arrived at from the study of the development
of Roman Law and from its comparison with the law of the Bible
were very startling and contrary to the then prevailing views of
jurisprudence. According to these conclusions there are certain
leitmotives which clearly manifest themselves in the history of
Roman Law as well as in the Law of the Bible, to wit: the Law
protects the poor, the orphans, widows, minors, insane, the absent whose whereabouts are not known, and the unborn (nascitur
pro nato habetur quamquam de commodis eius agitur). In short
Petrazycki demonstrated with great craftmanship and mental
acumen that the law protects the most handicapped, the economically weak, and those who are not able to protect themselves or
their own interests.
Petrazycki's Introductionto the Study of Law and Morality (in
Russian), appeared in 1905. In 1907 Petrazycki published in two
volumes (in Russian) The Theory of Law and State in Connection with a Theory of Morality. These books, with certain omissions and condensations are now published as Law and Morality.
The purpose of Petrazycki's theory is to explain the nature, the
attributes and the effects of the legal phenomenon.
There may be different and equally important approaches
towards jurisprudence. One of them is the purely abstract, theoretical. This approach is made under the auspices of the motto:
scientia gratia scientiae. The theoretician of law states the specific characteristic of the legal phenomenon, pointing out that
which distinguishes the legal from the non-legal phenomenon
and analyzes the causal connections as well as the effects of that
phenomenon.
Petrazycki is thoroughly original in his methodology, in the
search and selection of the material for his theory, and in its exposition. Not satisfied with the theories of logical concepts and
reasoning as they were presented by Aristotle and John Stuart
3
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Mill, Petrazycki sets forth his own methodology, comprising both
his theory of logical concepts and of adequate theories.
One of the great obstacles to the formation of a scientific theory
of law is that in jurisprudence (as in the social sciences and the
humanities), there does not exist any correct doctrine on the formation of general concepts. Petrazycki wrote:
It is commonly assumed that, in order to form the concept "law,"
one should make a survey of legal phenomena, compare them with
one another and then with kindred phenomena, and finally select
the attributes which are common to the law and distinguish law
from other phenomena. That is, however, impossible: such surveys
and comparisons presuppose knowledge of what are- and what are
not- legal phenomena.4
In short, this method of creation of concepts, recommended
already by Aristotle, is based on a vicious circle: one decides in
his own mind the differentia speciftca of the phenomenon to be
defined, one selects according to that specific difference those
phenomena, and finally points out triumphantly that thus selected phenomena belong to the same class, because they have certain characteristic attributes.
Petrazycki gives another definition of general or class concepts:
A general or class concept is the idea of objects which possess
certain attributes or traits. A class consists of all the objects having
these traits. Thus the idea of white things is a class concept, and the
things themselves comprise the corresponding class. Class concepts
are by no means limited to things which actually exist: there are
class concepts of things entirely imaginary, such as those in
geometry, and even class concepts meant to cover real things are
not limited to those actually existent but include as well things of
the past and of the future possessing the relevant attributes. 5
Thus a typical idea of a class concept is: all phenomena with
the specific mark a or b, or ab, or abc etc. One does not, therefore, need to survey all things or phenomena of a certain class;
it is enough to examine one single thing or phenomenon and
through its analysis arrive at a truth which refers to all other
phenomena or things of that same class.
By an adequate theory Petrazycki understood such theoretical
propositions where the predicates and the subjects are precisely
commensurate. That is, the subjects of the theoretical proposition
are specifically referred to the predicates; and vice versa, that is,
that the predicates are specifically bound to the subjects. When
the subjects and predicates are adequate and the specific mark
of the class phenomena under observation can be connected
4

Id. at 17.

5 Id. at 18.
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either causally or logically with other attributes - such adequate
theories are also scientific theories.
Petrazycki found that the proper sphere where legal phenomena exist is the human mind and, especially, the ethical consciousness of the individual.
Copernicus fought the optical illusion that the sun evolves
around the earth; Petrazycki fought the psychological illusion
that the Law exists somewhere outside of our mind, somewhere
above, or somewhere among human individuals, or is an expression of a fantastically construed "will" of an organism, such as
the "will" of the community, of the Nation, State, etc. When we
deal with the legal proposition: A, the lessor, has the right to
obtain from B, the lessee, $5,000 in rent. There is a legal relationship between A and B. Where is it? Where can it be found for
the purpose of study? If A and B live in different states, could
we say that the legal relationship exists somewhere in the middle
way, or is it attached somehow to B, as the lessee, because he
is bound to pay the rent, or to A, as the obligee, who has the right
to demand the rent? The scientific and critical answer to these
questions is that the legal phenomenon exists in the mind of the
third person C, who supposes that A has a right to receive and that B is bound to pay $5,000.6
Legal phenomena consist of unique psychic processes . . . expressed, incidentally, in the unique form of ascribing to different
beings ... or to certain classes of such beings, "duties" and "rights";
so that these beings, so conceived of, are seemingly found in certain
bound or of possessing special objects
peculiar conditions of being
("rights"), and the like.7

For thousands of years a distinction was being made between
law and morality. According to Petrazycki the legal and moral
phenomena belong to a common, higher class of ethical phenomena. The characteristic feature of ethical phenomena is that
they impose upon the person experiencing them a feeling of
being bound, and that this feeling of boundness is imbued by
some mystical authority. Some of the ethical experiences are
purely imperative, which means that we feel that our duty depends on our free will and is not something which is secured
to another as due to him. Petrazycki classifies these experiences
as moral ones. On the other hand, there are ethical experiences
,of such a nature, that while we are bound to do or to abstain
-from something, we feel that the object of our duty is not dependent on our free will, but has a corresponding right. This
'class of ethical phenomena Petrazycki classifies as legal phenoId. at 7.
7 Id. at 8.
6
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mena. The differentia specitca of legal phenomena is that while
moral phenomena are purely imperative, legal phenomena are
not only imperative but also attributive.
It should be pointed out that Petrazycki's theories on the
psychology of ethical phenomena specifically, as well as in the
other domains of human behavior, are absolutely up to date,
and that nobody has surpassed him in his classification of psychic
phenomena. Moreover, his theories in the field of the motivation of human behavoir are not only of great theoretical but of
great practical value as well.
All the above discussion concerned jurisprudence as a theoretical science. However, besides the theoretical approach to jurisprudence, there may be different practical approaches: the normative and dogmatic approach which has as a purpose to establish with precision the scope and content of the legal norm.
On the other hand, jurisprudence can also be considered from
the viewpoint of legal policy. This viewpoint has two aspects:
the critical one which evaluates the already existing law and
also the creative one, which refers to the law to be formed in
the future. Both aspects are being evaluated from the viewpoint
of socially desirable goals.
Applying his theory to the phenomena of practical legal life
with great craftsmanship, Petrazycki has explained the functions
of practical jurisprudence. According to his opinion, its most important task is to discover ways to protect the weak and the poor.8
Petrazycki has set forth the following propositions as the foundations of a scientific policy of law. The law is a motivational
factor. Its motivational effect upon the human mind is constant,
thus creating habits and propensities of that type which make
people more adaptable to life in community. It eradicates antisocial propensities which would make life in community either
miserable or impossible. Through its constant and perpetual effect, it molds the human mind and character of each individual
and of the mass of the people, effectuating in this way a change
in the character of the individual, as well as in the character of
the mass. Thus, besides being a motivational factor, the law becomes an educational factor too. "Rational law," wrote Petrazycki,
represents a complex and mighty school which aims at socializing the national character and adjusting it to rational coexistence.
Unsuccessful law may spread demoralization and poison the national spirit- or at least counteract the healthy psychic process
and retard the development ... of individual and mass character. 9

Petrazycki has analyzed further the consequences of the mo8 Id. at 144-145.
9 Id. at 301.
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tivational and educational function of the so-called law of free enterprise economy, consisting of the combination of a few
legal principles to wit: (1) Every adult citizen has a right, in
general terms to organize his life as he pleases. (2) The tools of
production and the land is divided among individuals or corporations on the basis of the law of property-given with the
exclusive right of utendi and abutendito the owners. (3) According to the law of inheritance, the free enjoyment, with no obligations to render an accounting, is granted to one and his heirs
forever. (4) According to the principles of modern family law,
the upbringing of children is a function of the parents, and chiefly that of "the father of the family." (5) The members of the
contemporary society not being obliged to work for the welfare
of others and having no claim to obtain from others the necessaries, obtain by barter what is necessary for themselves in exchange for the objects being at their disposal. They enter into
mutual agreements, contracts, in order to get money or food
for labor, or sell their goods in order to obtain money. The guiding
principle of the contract-law is the principle: pacta sunt servanda
under the sanction of damages for non-fulfillment of the contract.
The combination of these few legal principles works as a
. . . powerful psychic pressure in favor of zealous concern that
the elements of national wealth entrusted to the uncontrolled
disposition of individuals be utilized in the best way for the production of new economic goods (corresponding to the social needs of
the nation) so that these may be furnished where they are the
most useful and the most needed.' 0

Summing up his propositions on the motivational and educative functions of law, Petrazycki thought that the guiding ideal
to which unconsciously the development of law proceeds is the
ideal of brotherly, active love. And at the same time these propositions give the criteria for the distinction of good law and bad
law. According to Petrazycki, the final test and distinction in
evaluating the law as positive and negative would depend on
whether or not such law would aid or hinder the fulfillment of
the supreme idea of brotherly love.
Petrazycki's Law and Morality has explained from the point
of view of the psychological theory of law the basic concepts
of legal theory: legal subjects, legal objects, norms and legal
relationships.
The most illuminating sections are devoted to the differentiation of various species of law. Petrazycki has given a penetrating
analysis of the mutual relationship of what he calls intuitive law
10

Id. at 305-306.
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and positive law. His observations shed a new light on mutual
relation of law and equity and the final merger of both in AngloAmerican jurisprudence (as for instance in mortgage law). He
discussed justice as an expression of intuitive law and found the
latter to be the basis of the legal order. Then came a fine analysis
of different species of positive law, such as the statutory law, customary law, the law of court practice, book law, i.e., law based
on books and treatises of learned jurists, and other species of
positive law.
In each of the enumerated subject-matters Petrazycki has always had something original to say, something that was never
heard hitherto. He tried especially to establish some tendencies
in the development of the law: such as the tendency towards
the decrease of motivational pressure through the ages of the
history of law; the tendency towards the increasing loftiness in
the quality of motivation which induces the members of the community to an active and socially useful life. Let us compare, for
instance, the methods in which the needs of the community were
provided: in ancient times through the means of slave work, later,
in the MViddle Ages with the Feudal System through serfdom and
corvee, then with the free enterprise -through
a free labor
contract.
Petrazycki's deep understanding of the mutual relationship
and .interdependence of the intuitive and positive law has created a vivid picture showing how the intuitive law is sometimes
a guiding light in positive law, and how progressive positive law
has the effect of evoking into life progressive intuitive law.
Though Petrazycki was a believer in social progress, and especially a believer in the greater educational social power of law
than of morality, he was by no means naive. He stressed the
vindictivness of legal emotions in case of non-fulfillment of the
attributive, exacting side of the legal psyche. Out of the discrepancies between intuitive law and positive law, of customary
law and progressive positive or intuitive law, arise the great
social convulsions and clashes-revolutions and civil wars.
Petrazycki's theory serves as an excellent basis to explain in the
terms of these discrepancies the American and the French Revolution, the Civil War between the States, etc.
The scope and content of Petrazycki's work, the depth of its
analytical reasoning, the original views on the development of
the law and on the sources of revolutions and civil wars - endow
it with such significance, that it should be read not only by the
members of the legal profession, but also by psychologists, sociologists, theologians, historians and philosophers. It presents
law as the phenomenon of culture. It comprises the wisdom of
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theory, the knowledge of facts, and corresponds to the most urgent needs of our time: the need for a guiding light in the domain of legal policy.
Summing up, we can say that the work of Petrazycki has the
stamp of a genius which makes it comparable to the Nicomachean
Ethics of Aristotle. He presents a full, rich and scientifically explained picture of human ethical consciousness and gives an excellent exposition of the problems and nature of law and morality.
Professor Babb, author and co-author of important works in
the domain of law merchant, is an excellent translator. The text
to be translated was difficult even for a translator of such capacity as Professor Babb. It is his great merit that he undertook
this very arduous task and completed it successfully. The translation is simply brilliant, and in the English translation Petrazycki's
work is much clearer and more intelligible than in the original.
Zygmunt Epstein*

LEGIsLATIvE DRAFTING. By F.

Reed Dickerson.' Boston: Little,

Brown, & Co., 1954. Pp. ix, 149. $4.95. Mr. Dickerson has put
together a compact, interesting, and informative manual on the
technique or art, as the author undoubtedly would refer to it,
of drafting legislation. A copy of his book should be in the possession of all lawyers in the service of the federal or state governments who are called upon to draft, or advise in the drafting,
of statute or administrative rules and regulations. Moreover, the
book should be of considerable benefit for the attorney in private
practice whose skills in the drafting of legal instruments may
need sharpening. While necessarily manualistic in form, Mr.
Dickerson's little book is delightfully readable. This happy relief from the tedium from which most legal manuals congenitally
seem to suffer is due to the light, almost sprightly style with
which the author is blessed. Those who recoil at the boring
pursuit of the uninspiring pages of legal manuals of various kinds
should find the cover to cover reading of Legislative Drafting a
surprisingly easy feat.
Nor does the book sacrifice instruction and coverage of the
subject to interest and readability. Indeed, one of the few criticisms that might be made of the book is that the author sometimes wastes space on mechanical minutiae, such as his reminder
to the putative draftsman that he should have well sharpened
*L.L!., University of Warsaw; former member of the Warsaw Bar.
1 Chief, Codification Section, Office of General Counsel, Department of
Defense.
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pencils handy before he begins his job. Having shifted to a
more critical vein, mention might here be made that the book
suffers in one respect from the author's parochialism in presenting examples or experiences to illustrate some of his points.
Practically all Mr. Dickerson's examples, though often apt illustrations for the purpose cited, are drawn from his experiences
in drafting legislation for the Department of Defense, or even
more unfortunately from the point of view of being less than
typical, are those abstracted from some of the unbelievable aberrations of legal language that were not the infrequent characteristics of regulations issued by the Office of Price Administration. Of course, any work of this kind would be expected to
reflect in good measure the writer's own experiences in drafting
legislation. Nevertheless, it is regrettable that Mr. Dickerson
did not rely more for his examples or illustrations on bills and
statutes which he must have come across while serving with
the Legislative Reference Service of the House of Representatives. If this had been done, in the reviewer's opinion, there
would have been added to the book a balance that it does not
now enjoy.
Despite the defects mentioned, however, the book has undeniable merit as a valuable reference work and working tool for
the attorney who must face the problem of drafting bills or
regulations. While elemental in nature, it is precisely that quality which makes it worth while as a working tool for those who
need one in this field. Combined with its readability, the detailed check list of the "do's and don'ts" of sound legislative
drafting which the book provides entitles it to be ranked as a
significant contribution to the few helpful source materials that
now exist on the general subject of legislative drafting.
The reviewer has one final criticism, directed not so much at
the book as to a point of view of the author's which from time
to time he imparts throughout his work. Mr. Dickerson seems
taken with the somewhat dandified notion that legislative draftsmen are a class of experts quite apart from lawyers generally
and that access to the cult is, or should be, a difficult thing by
which to come. We will concede that the drafting of legislative
or administrative administration is indeed a specialty. However,
unless the law schools of the country are neglecting completely
one of their basic functions, i.e., adequate training in the use of
law and language to articulate ideas, it strikes the reviewer as a
mistaken emphasis to suggest that well educated lawyers cannot
master the skill necessary to accomplish, when called upon, the
task of writing an understandable, cohesive statute or regulation
designed to carry out a particular purpose of the client. Actually,
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there may be a substantial disadvantage should Mr. Dickerson's
view gain acceptance with legislative or administrative bodies
and a priesthood of legislative draftsmanship be created. This
would result in isolation or at least separation from those lawyers
who operate in the substantive field with which the proposed
legislation to be drafted would be concerned. Apart from the
hazard that draftsmen thus compartmentalized will be less well
informed on the subject with which they must deal, once having
placed the draftsman in the strategic and elevated position of
writing the law, the temptation would arise to accept them as
authorities who are not only most qualified as to what should be
put in or kept out of the statute or regulation, but also, after its
passage, to rely on them as its most conversant interpreters and
best administrators. Such a position is not without logic in its
support. Having drafted a technical piece of legislation, it can
be persuasively contended that the technicians who created it
are those best qualified to have custody of operations under it.
While it is true that early in the book Mr. Dickerson does warn
of this tendency toward self or group aggrandizement among
draftsmen, his admonition is subsequently obfuscated by his
excessive emphasis on the special skills and attributes that are
those of the legislative draftsman and to which few attorneys
can aspire.
Part of the standard equipment of a trained lawyer should
be the ability to cast language not only in argumentative or analytical form, as in brief writing but also to put it together as
the text of statutes or regulations. Mr. Dickerson's book should
help attorneys who have occasion to refer to it to achieve that
latter ability. If so, we should hope that the author would not
regret too much the fact that his own work helped to dispute his
thesis that accomplished legislative drafting must remain a talent
reserved for the few rather than become the common possession
of the trained advocate both within and outside of the public
service.
Alfred L. Scanlan*

THE PUBLIC PHImosopny. By Walter Lippmann.' Boston: Little,
Brown & Co. 1955. Pp. xm, 189. $3.50. Of the two great fears
driving men to a reconsideration of the natural law position, only
one has been fully articulated in this country. This is, of course,
*

Member of the District of Columbia and Indiana bars.
1 Noted Publicist: Author of A PREFACE

(1922) and many others.
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the fear that our individual liberties will be swept away by
authoritarian social orders unless they are anchored in a firmer
ground than the positivist doctrines of law as effective command,
accepted sanction, or cultural consensus. Many thinkers and institutions, not least the Natural Law Institute at Notre Dame,
have sounded the warning and pointed to the cure.
The other drive, however, has not found as forceful expression as the first. This is the converse fear that democracy will be
lost not by reason of the imposition of order by the self-justified
power of a dominant group- but by reason of excessive liberty
leading to reaction. Many have recognized but few have stated
that human rights which are not kept within the limits of human
duties become irresponsible and self-destructive. Yet it is a
common-place irony that collectivist theories- Communist,
Fascist, Nazi, and others- have succeeded in large measure because democratic theory has given too much attention to individual freedom and too little to social responsibilities and the
common good.
This is a delicate subject in our present climate of opinion because of its susceptibility of misinterpretation. Yet the point
needs to be made and developed- and by a person of unquestioned integrity, acknowledged detachment, and broad sympathy
with democracy.
It is a happy event, then, when a journalist-philosopher of
the stature of Mr. Lippmann brings out these truths. As Mr.
Lippmann says:
... we must adopt the habit of thinking as plainly about the
sovereign people as we do about the politicians they elect. It will
not do to think poorly of the politicians and to talk with bated
breath about the voters. No more than the kings before them should
the people be hedged with divinity.... [T]hey are betrayed by
the servile hypocrisy which tells them that what is true and what
is false, what
is right and what is wrong, can be determined by
2
their votes.

Basically his book is a protest against the popularity test of
right and wrong and an affirmation of the existence of an
objective, qualitative standard of right and wrong. This emerges
gradually from a discussion of many subordinate points, related
ideas and historical vistas. It does not emerge at once and
clearly. It is only after a progressive widening out of his original diagnosis of the democratic malady and the cure, that we
can see the underlying thesis.
Because of this progressive deepening of his thought, the
2

Text at 14.
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unsympathetic reader could easily find fault with apparent incoherencies and non-sequiturs. The only fair way to read it is
as one listens to one who is thinking aloud. Indeed Mr. Lippmann
expressly notes that he wrote it:
• . . in an effort to come to terms in my own mind and heart
with the mounting disorder in our Western society. . .. I began
writing, impelled by the need to make more intelligible to myself
the alarming failure of the Western liberal democracies to cope with

the realities of this century.3

Mr. Lippmann begins with the failure of the democracies to
cope with the problem of war. Mass opinion has acquired the
decisive power; and
... the prevailing public opinion has been destructively wrong
at the critical junctures . . .too pacifist in peace and too bellicose
in war, too
neutralist or appeasing in negotiation or too in4
transigent.

Not only in preventing war or preserving peace, but in the issues
of security and insolvency, and of order and revolution, the
democracies have shown alarming irresponsibility and weakness.
As a consequence anti-democratic revolutionary movements have
manifested alarming strength, for the people ".

.

. will choose

authority, which promises to be paternal, in preference to freedom which threatens to be fratricidal."'
The trouble is, in Mr. Lippmann's opinion, the masses as such,
or public pluralities as such, are simply not equal to the task
of governing. They lack adequate knowledge; they cannot be
kept fully informed and up to date; much information is necessarily withheld or distorted. Furthermore they can only say
"'yes" or "no", and usually this is "yes" to the proper end but
"no" to the necessary means since they inevitably choose the
softer, easier decision over the harder but proper one. Moreover, a mere momentary plurality of voters is by no means
competent to speak as the representative of the "people" or the
"public interest": the "people" are a changing group, constituting the whole community, young and old, and including even
unborn generations.
According to Mr. Lippmann the masses are not meant to govern;
they are meant to choose the governors and to criticize, assent
or veto what the governors do. The executive power alone
should have initiative. The legislative branch should function
as the advocate of the people.
3 Id. at 3 and 4.
4 Id. at 20.
5 Id. at 61.
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A basic derangement of function began in about the year 1917.
From that time onward the masses have become increasingly
dominant and the executive powers have become progressively
enfeebled, such that political leaders are basically intimidated
servants of majority opinion who occasionally in the public
interest circumvent this opinion. The causes of the derangement
have been twofold. First, the enormous monetary requirements
of governments have necessitated popular consent and led to
popular control. Second, the superficiality of popular judgment,
believing only in the tangible universe of the senses, has stripped
the executive leadership of "the imponderable powers," i.e., the
aura of majesty which surrounds and strengthens a morally
correct leadership.
To be sure there are many devices by which reliance on decision by mere numbers is sought to be limited.
... [M]uch invention and reforming energy have been applied
to finding other ways to insulate the judicial, the executive and the
administrative functions from the heavy pressures of "politics"
and "politicians." The object has been to separate them from the
electoral process .... The civil service, the military services, the
foreign service, the scientific and technical services, the quasijudicial administrative tribunals, the investigating commissions,
the public schools and institutions of learning, should be substantially independent of the elections.
Yet implicit in them there is a principle which, if it can be
applied deeply enough, gets at the root of the disorder of modern
democracy. It is that though public officials are elected by the
voters, or are appointed by men who are elected, they owe their
primary allegiance not to the opinions of the voters but to the law,
to the criteria of their professions, to the integrity of the arts and
sciences in which they work, to their own conscientious and responsible convictions of their duty within the rules and the frame
of reference they have sworn to respect.6

Traced to its source, the basic cause of the derangement is
what Mr. Lippmann calls the prevailing "Jacobin Spirit" which
teaches that there will be an earthly paradise when our natural
impulses are liberated from artificial authority and restraint a doctrine that sprang from the French exasperation with their
closed, incompetent aristocracy. This spirit led naturally from
the French Revolution against ruling classes to the Communist
Revolution against the capitalist bourgeois class and ultimately
to the Leninist doctrine of continuous revolution to overcome all
opposition. Unlike the responsible and stable governments arising where there is an open aristocracy or a constitutional monarchy, the Jacobin governments are revolutionary and utopian.
6

Id. at 51.
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There is involved the idea of a collective redemption of mankind
and a building of a heaven on earth.
The hidden lair of the trouble consists in the great sin of
pride. Man arrogates to himself the role of God, and confuses the
realm of essence (ideals, perfection) with the realm of existence
(practical prudence and possibility). He forgets that the old
Adam must be educated into a self-disciplined new Adam, that
an unrestrained allowance of all natural inclinations cannot be
permitted.
The cure which Mr. Lippmann suggests for all this is a return
to the public philosophy. "The public philosophy is known as
natural law, a name which, alas, causes great semantic confusion."7 This philosophy was present with our Founding Fathers
and is what makes democracy work. It gives a common direction
which fills the vacuum and anarchy of pure freedom and tolerance and makes society cohere. It is a substratum of right and
justice that we share and it supplies the qualitative, self-mastering, principle necessary to limit and guide decisions by sheer
plurality. In other words, Mr. Lippmann argues for the introduction of an artistocratic principle into the democratic framework.
And in fact, he makes this explicit in a later part of the book.8
What is the natural law?
They are the laws of rational order of human society -in the
sense that all men, when they are sincerely and lucidly rational,
will regard them as self-evident. The rational order consists of
the terms which must be met in' order to fulfill men's capacity for
the good life in this world. They are the terms of the widest consensus of rational men in a plural society. They are the propositions to which all men concerned, if they are sincerely and lucidly
rational, can be expected to converge. 9

The author discusses in detail the application of the rational
order in only two areas - property rights and freedom of speech
-showing
the natural limits on both. (Incidentally he justifies
freedom from censorship by the necessity of public debate to
get at the truth, so that if there is no true debate, censorship
is necessary.)
Rational procedure is the ark of the conyenant of the public
philosophy.' 0
We find, then, that the principle of freedom of speech, like that
of private property, falls within the bounds of the public philosophy.
It can be justified, applied, regulated in a plural society only by
adhering to the postulate that there is a rational order of things
7 Id. at 101.
8 Id. at 140.
9 Id. at 123.
10 Id. at 133.
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in which it is possible, by sincere inquiry and rational debate,
to distinguish the true and the false, the right and the wrong,
the good which leads to the realizations of human ends and the
evil which leads to destruction and to the death of civility.
The free political institutions of the Western world were conceived and established by men who believed that honest reflection
on the common experience of mankind would always cause men
to come to the same ultimate conclusions. Within the Golden Rule
of the same philosophy for elucidating their ultimate ends, they
could engage with confident hope in the progressive discovery of
truth. All issues could be settled by scientific investigation and
by free debate if -but only if - all the investigators and the
debaters adhered to the public philosophy; if, that is to say, they
used the same criteria and rules of reason for arriving at the truth
and for distinguishing good and evil.1l
men of
. . . the highest laws are those upon which all rational
2
good will, when fully informed, will tend to agree.'
History will be society's mirror to build and preserve from
generation to generation a "tradition of civility." Yet Mr. Lippmann is quite clear that natural law theory must be reworked in
modern idiom and addressed to modern problems. Mr. Lippmann
thinks that the
. . . public philosophy cannot be popular. For it aims to resist
and to regulate those very desires and opinions which are most
popular.13
Nor is it easy to teach, being intangible. The basic problem is
to accommodate its profound spiritual and philosophic truths to
the senses- by parable, symbol and analogy- making them
concrete. The idea of a public contract (the Constitution) is an
example of "concretization." The starting point is to teach the
teachers. Our philosophers and theologians have a key role in
clearing the atmosphere for a new acceptance of a transcendental,
rational order of things. The principles of the public philosophy
• . . cannot be made to prevail if they are discredited, - if they
are dismissed as superstition, as obscurantism, as meaningless metaphysics, as reactionary, as self-seeking rationalizations.14
In short, the democracies must recapture the sense of the
"mandate of heaven" if they are to succeed in rescuing themselves.
How shall we appraise this book? To begin with it is evident
that it has the weaknesses of its strength; that is to say, it has
the faults of any eloquent exploratory thinking: the parts do not
11 Id. at 134.
12 Id. at 160.

13 Id. at 162.
'1 id. at 179.
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always seem to hang together because the writer is penetrating
deeper and deeper into his subject, leaving his starting point far
behind in the excitement of the various vistas that he opens up.
For example, Mr. Lippmann's proposed cure does not clearly
match the original evil. He begins with a lament over the popular errors arising chiefly in the field of international order
whereas he ends with the medicine of natural law applied in
detail by him only to the fields of free speech and property
rights. Again, at first he finds the evil in the over-extension of
the power of the mass opinion at the expense of executive power;
then he sees it in the prevalence of the Jacobin spirit (which
cannot be allocated to the masses over the executive); and
finally he places the evil in the sin of pride (to which all men
are prone).
One would desire that in thinking his way through to the
basic evil, positivism and pride, and the basic cure, the acknowledgment of a knowable, objective, rational, moral order,
he would not rely so much upon certain questionable points not
necessary to his thesis. Thus the idea of an historical turning
point in 1917 seems dubious. The mistakes of the rulers before
1917 were as gross as the people's afterwards. And the errors
of the people after 1917 were in a large measure shared by their
leaders, whether Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Wilson, or
Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin. Actually history would seem to
indicate as many great errors by a government uninhibited by
pluralities as the opposite, and conversely as many correct decisions by the majority as by uninhibited leaders. Mr. Lippmann
appears not to do justice to the many correct decisions of the
majority. As a result the presentation tends to give the impression that the executive department of the government if freed
from popular pressure would rule wisely and well. This is not
Mr. Lippmann's meaning.
Also the suggestion that the executive department should
initiate and the legislative department advocate is to pitch the
antithesis of quality vs. quantity on too low a plane. Surely the
makers of the laws should initiate and share in the leadership.
The evil is not the cession of powers to the legislative, but the
loss by both legislative and executive of a sense of justice transcending subjective and quantitative tests.
Again one feels that, insofar as the United States is concerned,
Mr. Lippmann has overstated the prevalence of the revolutionary,
radical spirit of Jacobinism.
One would wish a clearer distinction between the failures of
the people flowing from inadequate information (which might
possibly be corrected) and those flowing from the inherent in-
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capacity of the people to administer their affairs in any detailed
sense.
Finally, it seems to this reviewer that Mr. Lippmann has overdrawn the gulf between spiritual ideals and practical applications; between the Apostles, as it were, and the practitioners.
The theme of existence vs. essence has not the same philosophic
meaning as iVr. Lippmann gives it in his book. Ideals are not
necessarily unattainable or irreducible to the concrete. The Ten
Commandments are not so vague. After all it is a quite definite
directive to say, "don't lie", "don't murder", "don't steal"- and
quite attainable and attained in the vast majority of actions.
Kindness and brotherhood are quite general ideals and yet quite
simple to explain in concrete terms.
On balance, however, the virtues of Mr. Lippmann's book far
outweigh the apparent defects. The central thesis seems unassailable: the democracies, to survive, must build upon an objective rational order transcending majority opinions and giving
moral legitimacy to a non-servile leadership. The message is
timely: there is a need to 'redress a one-sided view of the natural
law ideas of freedom and to prevent a false deification of popular pluralities. The publication is courageous: -one
must admire the taking up of a potentially unpopular position that has
and will subject the author to accusations of being distrustful
of the people. The style is eloquent and direct: a well-known
Lippmann characteristic. Finally the presentation is highly stimulating: an effect given by the manifestations of wide reading,
large experience and far ranging vision.
In short, one must congratulate Mr. Lippmann on the trend of
his thought, the timeliness of his message, the courage of his
undertaking, and the eloquence and suggestiveness of his
presentation.
George Constable*

* Member of the Maryland Bar.
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